### 1NC

**The aff becomes an alibi for acquiescence of class struggles – they obscure the logic of capital and ensure repetition of oppression**

**Zavarzadeh 94** (Mas'Ud, The Stupidity That Consumption Is Just as Productive as Production": In the Shopping Mall of the Post-al Left," College Literature, Vol. 21, No. 3, The Politics of Teaching Literature 2 (Oct., 1994),pp. 92-114)

Post-al logic is marked above all by its erasure of "production" as the determining force in organizing human societies and their institutions, and its insistence on "consumption" and "distribution" as the driving force of the social.5 The argument of the post-al left (briefly) is that "labor," in advanced industrial "democracies," is superseded by "information," and consequently "knowledge" (not class struggle over the rate of surplus labor) has become the driving force of history. The task of the post-al left is to deconstruct the "metaphysics of labor" and consequently to announce the end of socialism and with it the "outdatedness" of the praxis of abolishing private property (that is, congealed alienated labor) in the post-al moment. Instead of abolishing private property, an enlightened radical democracy which is to supplant socialism (as Laclau, Mouffe, Aronowitz, Butler, and others have advised) should make property holders of each citizen. The post-al left rejects the global objective conditions of production for the local subjective circumstances of consumption, and its master trope is what R-4 [France] so clearly foregrounds: the (shopping) "mall"?the ultimate site of consumption "with all latest high-tech textwares" deployed to pleasure the "body." In fact, the post-al left has "invented" a whole new interdiscipline called "cultural studies" that provides the new alibi for the regime of profit by shifting social analytics from "production" to "consumption." (On the political economy of "invention" in ludic theory, see Transformation 2 on "The Invention of the Queer.") To prove its "progressiveness," the post-al left devotes most of its energies (see the writings of John Fiske, Constance Penley, Michael Berube, Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Andrew Ross, Susan Willis, Stuart Hall, Fredric Jameson), to demonstrate how "consumption" is in fact an act of production and resistance to capitalism and a practice in which a Utopian vision for a society of equality is performed! The shift from "production" to "consumption" manifests itself in post-al left theories through the focus on "superstructural" cultural analysis and the preoccupation not with the "political economy" ("base") but with "representation"? for instance, of race, sexuality, environment, ethnicity, nationality, and identity. This is, for example, one reason for [Hill's] ridiculing the "base" and "superstructure" analytical model of classical Marxism (Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy) with an anecdote (the privileged mode of "argument" for the post-al left) that the base is really not all that "basic." To adhere to the base/superstructure model for [him] is to be thrown into an "epistemological gulag." For the post-al left a good society is, therefore, one in which, as [France] puts it, class antagonism is bracketed and the "surplus value" is distributed more evenly among men and women, whites and persons of color, the lesbian and the straight. It is not a society in which "surplus value"?the exploitative appropriation of the other's labor-is itself eliminated by revolutionary praxis. The post-al left's good society is not one in which private ownership is obsolete and the social division of labor (class) is abolished. Rather it is a society in which the fruit of exploitation of the proletariat (surplus labor) is more evenly distributed and a near-equality of consumption is established. This distributionist/consumptionist theory that underwrites the economic interests of the (upper)middle classes is the foundation for all the texts in this exchange and their pedagogies. A good pedagogy in these texts therefore is one in which power is distributed evenly in the classroom: a pedagogy that constructs a classroom of consensus not antagonism (thus opposition to "politicizing the classroom" in OR-1 [Hogan]) and in which knowledge (concept) is turned through the process that OR-3 [McCormick] calls "translation"?into "consumable" EXPERIENCES. The more "intense" the experience, as the anecdotes of [McCormick] show, the more successful the pedagogy. In short, it is a pedagogy that removes the student from his/her position in the social relations of production and places her/him in the personal relation of consumption: specifically, EXPERIENCE of/as the consumption of pleasure. The post-al logic **obscures** the laws of motion of capital by very specific assumptions and moves-many of which are rehearsed in the texts here. I will discuss some of these, mention others in passing, and hint at several more. (I have provided a full account of all these moves in my "Post-ality" in Transformation 1.) I begin by outlining the post-al assumptions that "democracy" is a never-ending, open "dialogue" and "conversation" among multicultural citizens; that the source of social inequities is "power"; that a post-class hegemonic "coalition," as OR-5 [Williams] calls it-and not class struggle-is the dynamics of social change; that truth (as R-l [Hill] writes) is an "epistemological gulag"? a construct of power and thus any form of "ideology critique" that raises questions of "falsehood" and "truth" ("false consciousness") does so through a violent exclusion of the "other" truths by, in [Williams'] words, "staking sole legitimate claim" to the truth in question. Given the injunction of the post-al logic against binaries (truth/falsehood), the project of "epistemology" is displaced in the ludic academy by "rhetoric." The question, consequently, becomes not so much what is the "truth" of a practice but whether it "works." (Rhetoric has always served as an alibi for pragmatism.) Therefore, [France] is not interested in whether my practices are truthful but in what effects they might have: if College Literature publishes my texts would such an act (regardless of the "truth" of my texts) end up "cutting our funding?" [he] asks. A post-al leftist like [France], in short, "resists" the state only in so far as the state does not cut [his] "funding." Similarly, it is enough for a cynical pragmatist like [Williams] to conclude that my argument "has little prospect of effectual force" in order to disregard its truthfulness. The post-al dismantling of "epistemology" and the erasure of the question of "truth," it must be pointed out, is undertaken to protect the economic interests of the ruling class. If the "truth question" is made to seem outdated and an example of an orthodox binarism ([Hill]), any conclusions about the truth of ruling class practices are excluded from the scene of social contestation as a violent logocentric (positivistic) totalization that disregards the "difference" of the ruling class. This is why a defender of the ruling class such as [Hill] sees an ideology critique aimed at unveiling false consciousness and the production of class consciousness as a form of "epistemological spanking." It is this structure of assumptions that enables [France] to answer my question, "What is wrong with being dogmatic?" not in terms of its truth but by reference to its pragmatics (rhetoric): what is "wrong" with dogmatism, [he] says, is that it is violent rhetoric ("textual Chernobyl") and thus Stalinist. If I ask what is wrong with Stalinism, again (in terms of the logic of [his] text) I will not get a political or philosophical argument but a tropological description.6 The post-al left is a New Age Left: the "new new left" privileged by [Hill] and [Williams]- the laid-back, "sensitive," listening, and dialogic left of coalitions, voluntary work, and neighborhood activism (more on these later). It is, as I will show, anti-intellectual and populist; its theory is "bite size" (mystifying, of course, who determines the "size" of the "bite"), and its model of social change is anti-conceptual "spontaneity": May 68, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and, in [Hill's] text, Chiapas. In the classroom, the New Age post-al pedagogy inhibits any critique of the truth of students' statements and instead offers, as [McCormick] makes clear, a "counseling," through anecdotes, concerning feelings. The rejection of "truth" (as "epistemological gulag"?[Hill]), is accompanied by the rejection of what the post-al left calls "economism." Furthermore, the post-al logic relativizes subjectivities, critiques functionalist explanation, opposes "determinism," and instead of closural readings, offers supplementary ones. It also celebrates eclecticism; puts great emphasis on the social as discourse and on discourse as always inexhaustible by any single interpretation? discourse (the social) always "outruns" and "exceeds" its explanation. Post-al logic is, in fact, opposed to any form of "explanation" and in favor of mimetic description: it regards "explanation" to be the intrusion of a violent outside and "description" to be a respectful, caring attention to the immanent laws of signification (inside). This notion of description which has by now become a new dogma in ludic feminist theory under the concept of "mimesis" (D. Cornell, Beyond Accommodation)?regards politics to be always immanent to practices: thus the banalities about not politicizing the classroom in [Hogan's] "anarchist" response to my text7 and the repeated opposition to binaries in all nine texts. The opposition to binaries is, in fact, an **ideological alibi for erasing class struggle**, as is quite clear in [France's] rejection of the model of a society "divided by two antagonistic classes" (see my Theory and its Other).

**Alt Text: Vote Negative to validate and adopt the method of structural/historical criticism that is the 1NC.**

**Historical Method comes first – this debate is not about what the aff does but rather was the aff formulated with accurate knowledge on history – we must ground our debates in accurate historical methods that only Marxism can account for – their method prevents a transition to a society beyond oppression**

**TUMINO** **1**

(Stephen, Prof. English @ Pitt, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique)

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to **offer an integrated understanding of social practices** and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This **systematic inequality** **cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions** and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments **authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies**. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.

### 1NC

#### Interpretation: The affirmative must defend the inaction of a topical United States Federal Government policy

#### Part 1-

####  “Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum

Army Officer School ’04(5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, <http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm>)

The colon introduces the following: a. A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b. A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c. A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d. A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e. After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f. The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g. A *formal* resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

#### “United States Federal Government should” means the debate is solely about the outcome of a policy established by governmental means

Ericson ’03 (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb *should*—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, *should adopt* here **means to put a** program or **policy into action though governmental means**. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The **entire debate** is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### “Federal Government” means the central government in Washington D.C.

**Encarta ‘2K** (Online Encyclopedia, http://encarta.msn.com)

“The federal government of the United States is centered in Washington DC”

#### **Energy production must increase electricity generation**

Direskeneli 10 (Haluk, Journal of Turkish Weekly, " On Thermal Power Plants at our Backyard," <http://www.turkishweekly.net/columnist/3331/on-thermal-power-plants-at-our-backyard.html>)

Energy production is essential, it is mandatory to increase electricity generation for everyone. Everybody wants more electricity, but no one wants power plants in his/her backyard, even wind power plants since they create a lot of noise.

#### ‘Resolved’ means to enact a policy by law

Words and Phrases ‘64 (Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### Inclusion of “should” in the resolution requires a policy framework

Shors and Mancuso ’93 (Mathew and Steve, U Michigan, “The Critique: Skreaming Without Raising Its Voice”, Debaters Research Guide, http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/ShorsMancuso1993.htm)

Resolutional wording is typically such that an endorsement of policy enactment is necessary for the affirmative. Although topics and wordings change, topics converge to the core resolution of RESOLVED: THAT A POLICY SHOULD BE ADOPTED. "Should" or "should be" appears in every resolution. No topic to date has been of the sort RESOLVED: THAT POLITICALLY INCORRECT LANGUAGE IS IMMORAL. If the latter were the topic, Critique advocates would obviously have a stronger case. But our debate topics, which are selected by a vote of out membership, directly state a policy framework. The Critique, currently formulated as an a priori rejection of a proposition, is utterly irrelevant in that it does not reject the clear consensual basis of resolutional advocacy. That the affirmative uses racist language does not answer the argument that "policies should be adopted." The question of whether we should be debating policies is one that has already been answered for us.

#### Without stasis debate becomes meaningless and produces political strategy that is wedded to violence and fails to achieve productive change.

Ruth Lessl Shively, Assoc Prof Polisci at Texas A&M, 2000 *Political Theory and Partisan Politics* p. 182-3

The point may seem trite, as surely the ambiguists would agree that basic terms must be shared before they can be resisted and problematized. In fact, they are often very candid about this seeming paradox in their approach: the paradoxical or "parasitic" need of the subversive for an order to subvert. But admitting the paradox is not helpful if, as usually happens here, its implications are ignored; or if the only implication drawn is that order or harmony is an unhappy fixture of human life. For what the paradox should tell us is that some kinds of harmonies or orders are, in fact, good for resistance; and some ought to be fully supported. As such, it should counsel against the kind of careless rhetoric that lumps all orders or harmonies together as arbitrary and inhumane. Clearly some basic accord about the terms of contest is a necessary ground for all further contest**.** It may be that if the ambiguists wish to remain full-fledged ambiguists, they cannot admit to these implica­tions, for to open the door to some agreements or reasons as good and some orders as helpful or necessary, is to open the door to some sort of rationalism. Perhaps they might just continue to insist that this initial condition is ironic, but that the irony should not stand in the way of the real business of subversion.Yet difficulties remain. **For** agreement is not simply the initial condition, but the continuing ground, for contest. If we are to success­fully communicate our disagreements, we cannot simply agree on basic terms and then proceed to debate without attention to further agree­ments. For debate and contest are forms of dialogue: that is, they are activities premised on the building of progressive agreements. Imagine, for instance, that two people are having an argument about the issue of gun control. As noted earlier, in any argument, certain initial agreements will be needed just to begin the discussion. At the very least, the two discussants must agree on basic terms: for example, they must have some shared sense of what gun control is about; what is at issue in arguing about it; what facts are being contested, and so on. They must also agree—and they do so simply by entering into debate—that they will not use violence or threats in making their cases and that they are willing to listen to, and to be persuaded by, good arguments. Such agreements are simply implicit in the act of argumentation.

This is our internal link into our impacts- political specification is vital to creating an effective strategy

Silverstein ’02 (Marc, Anarchist Communitarian Network, “Breaking Free of the Protest Mentality”, 4-25,

<http://site.www.umb.edu/faculty/salzman_g/Strate/Discus/2002-04-25Silverstein.htm>)

But it seems that if a "movement" is going to be built, it needs a rational, comprehensive, holistic analysis of the current situation, and a **fleshed-out, detailed, practical strategy** to achieve whatever it is that happens to be its goals. The means must be consistent with the ends. This analysis and strategy would give direction to a movement and would act as a vehicle for personal and social transformation. What is alarming is the complete lack of any serious analysis or strategy, or even any concern over a lack of analysis or strategy, and the crowd's willingness, even eagerness to shout slogans, hold signs, and regurgitate the rhetoric of the speakers. Estimates for this march were put at 10-15,000 by the mainstream media and 75-100,000 by the independent media (both of whom exaggerate numbers to serve their particular agenda). Regardless, the march was in the tens of thousands. It seems that 50,000 people would be able to gather together and deliberate on a grassroots level, based on free association, through networks of affinity groups and spokes-councils, their strategic and organizational **plan of action**. Instead, those same 50,000 people chose to walk around as an amorphous mass, chanting, holding signs, letting the government know how bad and inhuman it is and how it should stop funding murderous states, and basically putting themselves in a humiliating position of powerlessness. Protestors are in the classic role of "protestors", people with no real power over their lives so they must demand it from the ruling class. Demonstrations also point to a lack of creativity; the only thing we can come up with is playing the song and dance of our rulers. How much longer will these protests go on for? If we could only get a few more tens of thousands to protest, will we be successful in overthrowing capitalism, the state and wage-slavery? Why do the state, capitalism and wage-slavery exist, why do the governments of the U.S. and Israel do what they do, and what are we actually going to do about it? One of the speakers, from a Muslim rights group, appealed to President Bush to warn Ariel Sharon that if he doesn't stop his war crimes, then immediate action will be taken. It is unbearably painful to witness such utter naivety. It is quite apparent that genocide and "war crimes" are normal functions of any state, that they are not doing anything irresponsible. The state will do anything to maintain its power, whether legal or illegal. Leftists and progressives point out that Israel has violated the Geneva Convention, and that their activity is "illegal". By accepting the false dichotomy of "legal"/"illegal" we are accepting their frame of reference and their world-view. We are viewing the situation from a liberal, idealistic perspective, of how the state is supposed to behave. Radicals and revolutionaries over a hundred years ago recognized the essential purpose of the state and capitalism, they weren't fooled by it, and they weren't sucked in by reformism. It seems we are a long way to go to reach the same logical conclusions that were reached in the 1870s! There seems to be a lack of prefigurative politics, or even an understanding of what that means. Prefigurative politics is based on the notion that the "future society" is how we act in the present, what kinds of interactions, processes, structures, institutions, and associations we create right now, and how we live our lives. The notion that we just need more people, more resources, and more money to be channeled into these protests is utterly naïve, because it mistakes the problem as being quantitative, when in fact it is qualitative. The qualitative component deals with how we treat each other, the quality of people's lives, meeting individual wants and preferences, strengthening our ability to clearly and honestly communicate with each other our concerns, needs, feelings, and requests, in the context of a small-scale face-to-face environment. On the other hand, protests are mostly concerned with numbers, masses, and large, bureaucratized organizations, concerns which all too often ignore the crucial individual and inter-personal aspects. The protests against the G-8 conference last July in Genoa, Italy included up to 200,000 demonstrators, yet the only outcomes of the protest were a militarized police state bordering on fascism (or perhaps fascist), one dead, and many imprisoned and seriously injured. The strategy of protest doesn't seem to be getting us anywhere, so it is a wonder why people continue to engage in this failed tactic. If a methodology is proven time and time again of not being successful, then the rational response would be to critically examine the inadequacies of the unsuccessful methodology, and creatively and collectively think up and experiment with new methodologies. The few instances when these mass demonstrations are critiqued, they are rarely ever rejected in toto; instead the solution is to have protests on the level of local communities and neighborhoods, rather than mass convergences to large cities. Their argument is that this would bridge the gap between activists and "regular people" and get more people active and radicalized in their local communities, and to have a more secure base of resistance. But the size of the protests are not the real problem, the real problem is the protest mentality itself, which remains qualitatively the same whether it's in a working-class neighborhood or in a major city. Most of the corporate media reported that the protests were overwhelmingly "peaceful", and many of the protestors were quite content with this. Both sides accept the dichotomy of "peaceful"/"violent", just as they accept the dichotomy of "legal"/"illegal". This traps them into a moralistic, Statist mindset. Even the militant black bloc in past protests has never failed to mention that "property destruction is not violence", which indicates that they still accept this basic duality. The media are our enemy, their interests are antithetical to ours, and to hope for any kind of "positive coverage" is pie in the sky. We should not be surprised if the police beat and arrest us, if the media defame us, and if the general public hate us. That is to be expected, and we should start to recognize this and move on. There doesn't seem to be so much a "movement" as there is a collection of divergent tendencies and ideologies, many of them incompatible with each other. With every protest, there has been very little attention to what we hope to achieve, and the claim that all protests, demonstrations, marches and rallies are useless and counter-productive is a new and shocking concept for most activists. The reason that the vast majority of "ordinary people" view us with fear and contempt is because we have nothing to offer them. The power of capitalism and the State does not exist in the streets, in blocking and shutting down major intersections. It exists in the everyday lives of people, more specifically: in their homes, workplaces, and communities. If we don't work on creating **practical alternatives** to the capitalist system, then it is no wonder most people won't join us - we don't offer them anything, and our petty squabbles are totally irrelevant to their lives. The strategy I propose is of creating spheres of autonomy and self-sufficiency based on free association and common preference finding: bolos, temporary and permanent autonomous zones, counter-institutions, popular assemblies (see: http://www.ipsnews.net/interna.asp?idnews=8614 for a contemporary example), small-scale decentralized agriculture, community gardens en masse, guilds, kibbutzes, worker-owned cooperatives, squats, local barter clubs (which have been popping up throughout parts of Argentina, see: http://www.infoshop.org/inews/stories.php? story=02/03/02/5676701, communist stores (based on the principle of "take what you need, donate what you can"), co-housing, urban and rural intentional communities, alternative and sustainable technology, computer-linked networks for co-ordinating and making decisions on a large-scale basis. Computer-linked networks may in fact supercede entirely the need for popular assemblies. The reason that creating these types of anti-authoritarian structures is a much more worthwhile strategy than protest and direct confrontation with the State is because it hits the State and capitalism where it hurts. Food Not Bombs, Independent Media Centers, micro-radio and the like are also important, but they don't provide people with food, clothing, and housing - that is, the real necessities of life. The Black Panthers' Party in the 1960s and 70s set up free breakfast and lunch programs for neighborhood kids, community medical clinics, and self-defense classes. The fact that these counter-institutions triggered so much State repression, sometimes more so than armed struggle, shows how effective and threatening they were to the State. Keith Preston, in "Anarchism or Anarcho-Social Democracy?", writes: "Strategically, we need to follow the example of the most successful anarchist forces of all time- the Spanish anarchist revolutionaries. Our revolutionary agenda should be to develop an alliance of community organizations, unions, cooperatives, enterprises, service organizations, youth clubs, study groups and other popular associations". What I've sketched above are just a few outlines of a strategy, described abstractly, which embodies the kind of direction I think we should be going in. The protest mentality is getting us nowhere, it is a strategy of powerlessness - it is not "what democracy looks like". If we are serious about doing away with this rotten system and living in a new way, we have to know what it is that we don't want, **what it is we do want, and how to go about getting what we want.** What we need is a new, radical, concrete, utopian praxis, free of the failed methodologies of Leftism, activism and protest.

#### Part 2-

#### Policy making is the only mechanism to achieve institutional change

**Taylor 9** (Matthew M, assistant professor of political science at the University of São Paulo, "Institutional Development through Policy-Making: A Case Study of the Brazilian Central Bank," World Politics - Volume 61, Number 3, July 2009, Muse) jl

This article considers another, perhaps more ubiquitous, cause of endogenously driven accretive institutional change: the policy-making process.[9](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.foley.gonzaga.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.3.taylor.html#f9) The policy-making process contributes to solving an important [End Page 489] theoretical problem by providing a bridge between explanations of institutional genesis and of institutional sustainability over time, which have tended to remain quite distinct.[10](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.foley.gonzaga.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.3.taylor.html#f10) Policy-making can be a causal force that is at work both in the emergence of institutions targeted to specific policy objectives and in their gradual evolution over time. It also provides a useful corrective to the punctuated equilibrium approach, which tends to overstate the stasis "beneath the surface of apparently stable formal institutional arrangements" as well as understate "continuity through putative breakpoints in history."[11](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.foley.gonzaga.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.3.taylor.html#f11) My logic follows the arguments of Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson (2005) on the endogeneity of institutional evolution. By their reasoning, the distribution of political power and the distribution of resources are key determinants of institutional choice: power and resources determine how collective choices are made and thus, what institutions are created. But once institutions are in place, they "affect the choice of economic institutions and influence the future evolution of political institutions," resource distribution, and political power.[12](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.foley.gonzaga.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.3.taylor.html#f12) Temporality is the only factor that saves this model from tautology. To this logic, I add the policy-making process, which is a key conduit between resources and power on the one hand, and institutions on the other. It is not the only factor influencing the allocation of resources, power, or institutional development, of course. And policy-making does not occur in a vacuum; it is influenced by elite attitudes and beliefs, priorities at the apex of the political system, competition between institutions and between actors, and by the course of deliberations over policy ends. But there are several reasons why the policy-making process may be a potent force, especially under ordinary conditions. First, as Paul Pierson has noted, policies have important effects on the rules of the game, "influencing the allocation of economic and political resources, modifying the costs and benefits associated with alternative political strategies, and consequently altering ensuing political development." [13](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.foley.gonzaga.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.3.taylor.html#f13) Second, even if it is highly contentious, policy-making can subtly shift political power in ways that may be imperceptible even to [End Page 490] participants, permitting institutional change to take place "below the radar" without a significant realignment of political forces or a discernible redistribution of societal resources. Third, policy-making matters to political institutions because it is, in a sense, what these institutions are all about. And while there is a certain self-preserving inertia to institutions, in the short term they tend to focus more on contestation over policy results than on debates about institutional structure itself. Policy change occurs relatively frequently and, like water flowing daily through a riverbed, can gradually mold institutions to its flow (even though the new shape of the riverbed will constrain the course of future policy-making). The policy-making process influences institutions in quotidian ways in part by reshaping internal institutional responsibilities. In the process of policy-making, which includes the tasks of designing, choosing, advocating, implementing, and adjusting specific policies, the commitments of individual members of the institution to specific institutional rules may harden or soften, depending on their perceptions about the effectiveness of policy. Policy-making also shapes the internal institutional playing field by reallocating responsibilities and prestige. Successful economic stabilization, for example, may make central banks more likely to focus attention on monetary policy than they might have been previously, and thus may privilege the custodians of monetary policy over a previously elite foreign-exchange trading desk devoted to the complex accounting for exchange transactions under high-inflation conditions. Such flows of talent and resources to new policy foci may remake the institution from the inside. Finally, policy-making often points outsiders-voters, politicians, or constituencies, for example-to institutional changes that would be needed to facilitate adoption or implementation of their preferred policies.

#### Theoretical remedies are insufficient- policy expertise is key to solve

McClean ‘1 (David E. “The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope,” Am. Phil. Conf., [www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past\_conference\_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm](http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past_conference_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david_mcclean.htm))

Yet for some reason, at least partially explicated in Richard Rorty's Achieving Our Country, a book that I think is long overdue, leftist critics continue to cite and refer to the eccentric and often a priori ruminations of people like those just mentioned, and a litany of others including Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard, Jameson, and Lacan, who are to me hugely more irrelevant than Habermas in their narrative attempts to suggest policy prescriptions (when they actually do suggest them) aimed at curing the ills of homelessness, poverty, market greed, national belligerence and racism. I would like to suggest that it is time for American social critics who are enamored with this group, those who actually want to be relevant, to recognize that they have a disease, and a disease regarding which I myself must remember to stay faithful to my own twelve step program of recovery. The disease is the need for elaborate theoretical "remedies" wrapped in neological and multi-syllabic jargon. These elaborate theoretical remedies are more "interesting," to be sure, than the pragmatically settled questions about what shape democracy should take in various contexts, or whether private property should be protected by the state, or regarding our basic human nature (described, if not defined (heaven forbid!), in such statements as "We don't like to starve" and "We like to speak our minds without fear of death" and "We like to keep our children safe from poverty"). As Rorty puts it, "When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been 'inadequately theorized,' you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version of economic determinism. . . . These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations"(italics mine).(1) Or as John Dewey put it in his The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, "I believe that philosophy in America will be lost between chewing a historical cud long since reduced to woody fiber, or an apologetics for lost causes, . . . . or a scholastic, schematic formalism, unless it can somehow bring to consciousness America's own needs and its own implicit principle of successful action." Those who suffer or have suffered from this disease Rorty refers to as the Cultural Left, which left is juxtaposed to the Political Left that Rorty prefers and prefers for good reason. Another attribute of the Cultural Left is that its members fancy themselves pure culture critics who view the successes of America and the West, rather than some of the barbarous methods for achieving those successes, as mostly evil, and who view anything like national pride as equally evil even when that pride is tempered with the knowledge and admission of the nation's shortcomings. In other words, the Cultural Left, in this country, too often dismiss American society as beyond reform and redemption. And Rorty correctly argues that this is a disastrous conclusion, i.e. disastrous for the Cultural Left. I think it may also be disastrous for our social hopes, as I will explain. Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?" The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."

#### This educational model is vital to policy and academia– prevents insular education- this answers FIAT isn’t real

Jentleson ‘2 (Bruce W. Jentleson, Source: International Security, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Spring, 2002), pp. 169-183, “Bringing Policy Relevance Back In”, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3092106>, Spring 2002, LEQ)

So, a Washington for- eign policy colleague asked, which of your models and theories should I turn to now? What do you academics have to say about September 11? You are sup- posed to be the scholars and students of international affairs-Why did it hap- pen? What should be done? Notwithstanding the surly tone, the questions are not unfair. They do not pertain just to political scientists and international relations scholars; they can be asked of others as well. It falls to each discipline to address these questions as they most pertain to its role. To be sure, political science and international relations have produced and continue to produce scholarly work that does bring important policy insights. Still it is hard to deny that contemporary political science and international relations as a discipline put limited value on policy relevance-too little, in my view, and the discipline suffers for it.1 The problem is not just the gap between theory and policy but its chasmlike widening in recent years and the limited valuation of efforts, in Alexander George's phrase, at "bridging the gap."2 The events of September 11 drive home the need to bring policy relevance back in to the discipline, to seek greater praxis between theory and practice. This is not to say that scholars should take up the agendas of think tanks, journalists, activists, or fast fax operations. The academy's agenda is and should be principally a more scholarly one. But theory can be valued without policy relevance being so undervalued. Dichotomization along the lines of "we" do theory and "they" do policy consigns international relations scholars almost exclusively to an intradisciplinary dialogue and purpose, with conver- sations and knowledge building that while highly intellectual are excessively insular and disconnected from the empirical realities that are the discipline's raison d'etre. This stunts the contributions that universities, one of society's most essential institutions, can make in dealing with the profound problems and challenges society faces. It also is counterproductive to the academy's own interests. Research and scholarship are bettered by pushing analysis and logic beyond just offering up a few paragraphs on implications for policy at the end of a forty-page article, as if a "ritualistic addendum."3 Teaching is enhanced when students' interest in "real world" issues is engaged in ways that reinforce the argument that theory really is relevant, and CNN is not enough. There also are gains to be made for the scholarly community's standing as perceived by those outside the aca- demic world, constituencies and colleagues whose opinions too often are self- servingly denigrated and defensively disregarded. It thus is both for the health of the discipline and to fulfill its broader societal responsibilities that greater praxis is to be pursued. September 11 Questions: Answers from the International Relations Literature? What knowledge is most needed to understand September 11 and the ques- tions posed about its causes, consequences, and the policy agenda it has set? And what answers do political scientists and especially international relations specialists have to offer? Four sets of questions need to be considered.

### 1NC

Their sympathy for the people who died at Hiroshima and Nagasaki is obscene – it puts them in league with the worst atrocities in human history

Newman, 95

Robert P., Professor Emeritus, University of Pittsburgh, won Gustavus Myers Center Outstanding Book on Human Rights Award, nominated for the Pulitzer Prize, the National book award, “Truman and the Hiroshima cult” 136-139

But this is not the end of the matter; a more sympathetic view of the desire for retaliation expressed by so many Americans in the 1940s comes from reading about Japanese atrocities on Allied pris­oners of war and to Asian peoples whom the Japanese conquered. One must also consider this analysis from Sheldon Cohen: I agree with you in being unhappy with [revenge as a motive for dropping the bombs], but that's not the same thing as being against revenge tout court. In some cases I am not sure how justice and revenge differ. Julius Streicher's execution was just; it may also have been an act of revenge—certainly we weren't trying to reform him. If so, taking revenge can sometimes be morally justified, or even obliga­tory. Not to punish the miscreant might be, as St. Anselm said in Cur Deus Homo, to make light of his crime, and therefore, a moral affront. I also believe that adult German and Japanese civilians in the 30's and 40's bore some responsibility for the acts agents of their govern­ment were performing or soon would be performing. It seems incon­sistent to hold a right of national self-determination, and to grant that these were the legitimate governments of Germany and Japan, while denying that the population shares any responsibility for the deeds of their governments.76 How do justice and revenge differ? Is it not true that the people and factories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as the rest of Japan, armed Tojo's butchers and sent them forth on their cam­paigns of pillage, rape, and murder? Despite the official effort to rehabilitate Japan's wartime record, the passage of time has loosened lips of Japanese who regretted par­ticipating in that war—who, in fact, had guilty consciences. One poignant instance is in Haruko Taya Cook and Theodore Cook's vol­ume of interviews with Japanese who lived through the war. The Cooks were talking to Hayashi Shigeo, who had been an engineer in Manchuria, and was sent in late 1945 on a team to Hiroshima and Nagasaki to determine what actually happened there. Hayashi was in Nagasaki: One day I went to the Mitsubishi arsenal and was photographing the torpedo plant. I was being escorted around by a Mitsubishi man. At some point he said to me, "This is where we made the first torpedoes, the ones dropped on Pearl Harbor at the onset of the Pacific War." The wrenches and tools used by the workers were lying there, all around me, as if they'd been set down a minute ago. I could have reached out myself and picked them up. Finally he said quietly, "Mr. Hayashi, the very first torpedo was launched from here in Nagasaki, and in the end here's where we were stabbed to death. We fought a stupid war, didn't we?" The two of us just stood there in silence.77 It is not the relatively rare Japanese mea culpas that are important here, but the overwhelming anguish of the millions of victims of the Japanese empire. Reading these accounts, sympathy for the 200,000 or so victims of the atom begins to fade. The books describing what the Japanese did to other human beings are never ending. These people had no John Hersey. Their stories are not often in his grip­ping prose. But they are heartrending accounts nonetheless. Had John Hersey visited Nanking or Manila and written about those cat­astrophes; had there been no competing and overshadowing specta­cle in Japan fueled by supernatural science; had Hiroshima not become a shrine to the peaceminded, the anguish of Japan's victims might be more on our consciences. And it is not just their anguish; it is their sheer numbers. Only after several years of study did I realize that, for some reason, I could find no one who had put together comprehensive figures showing the extent of Japanese-caused deaths. Statistics of the num­bers who died at Hitler's hands are in every account of his crimes. The same for victims of Stalin. Deaths during World War II's battles in the European-African theaters are readily available. Why is there no similar compilation for deaths caused by the Japanese? Perhaps that would be more difficult to compile than Hitler's statistics. Japan did conquer more different and far-flung territories and put Allied captives in 424 prison camps scattered over one-quarter of the globe.78 Nevertheless, it is possible to put together an estimate of how many people perished at Japanese hands. John Dower gives death figures for nine countries in his book; a United Nations (UN) docu­ment covers four other countries.79 Problem cases are China, where estimates of deaths from 1931 to 1945 range from two to thirty mil­lion; the Burma-Siam railway, where Murakami Hyoe gives a low estimate of 32,000, the Associated Press lists 116,000; and the Dutch East Indies, where the UN lists three million for Java, one million for the other islands; but the probable error must be high. I use the lowest figure in all cases except China, where ten million is a con­sensus figure, and the Burma-Siam railway, where I use the figure of the Allied War Graves Registration Unit:80 Deaths Attributable to the Japanese Empire, 1931-1945

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| China | 10,000,000 |
| Java (Dutch Indies) | 3,000,000 |
| Outer Islands | 1,000,000 |
| Philippines | 120,000 |
| India | 180,000 |
| Bengal famine | 1,500,000 |
| Korea | 70,000 |
| Burma-Siam railway | 82,500 |
| Indonesia, Europeans | 30,000 |
| Malaya | 100,000 |
| Vietnam | 1,000,000 |
| Australia | 30,000 |
| New Zealand | 10,000 |
| United States | 100,000 |
| Total [seventeen million] | 17,222,500 |

These were not painless deaths. They served no legitimate pur­pose. Many of them were nonbattle atrocities. Gavan Daws, in his Prisoners of the Japanese, summarizes the incredible record: Asia under the Japanese was a charnel house of atrocities. As soon as the war ended, evidence of war crimes began piling up, in moun­tains. POWs, civilian internees, and Asian natives starved, beaten, tor­tured, shot, beheaded. The water cure. Electric shock. Cannibalism. Men strung up over open flames or coiled in barbed wire and rolled along the ground, nails torn out, balls burned with cigarettes, dicks cut off and stuffed in mouths. Women dragged naked behind motor­cycles, raped and ripped open, babies skewered on bayonets. Cities in China and provinces in the Philippines laid waste, mass murders in the Indies, towns and villages wiped out, all the way to the remotest of small places in the Pacific, the island of Nauru, where the thirty-four sufferers in the leprosy hospital were taken out to sea and drowned, and Ocean Island, where days after the war ended all the native laborers were pushed over a cliff.81 The summary cannot do justice to the details. From the view­point of seeking justice, Pearl Harbor is no big deal; a mere 2,400 casualties. This pales before seventeen million. At least ten million of these occurred between 7 December 1941 and 30 August 1945. During these forty-five months, 200,000 to 300,000 persons died each month at Japanese hands. The last months were in many ways the worst; starvation and disease aggravated the usual beatings, beheadings, and battle deaths. It is plausible to hold that upwards of [two hundred fifty thousand] 250,000 people, mostly Asian but some Westerners, would have died each month the Japanese Empire struggled in its death throes beyond July 1945.

Japanese atrocities were worse than atomic bombings – treating Japan as the victim ignores history and endorses militarism

Newman, 95

Robert P., Professor Emeritus, University of Pittsburgh, won Gustavus Myers Center Outstanding Book on Human Rights Award, nominated for the Pulitzer Prize, the National book award, “Truman and the Hiroshima cult” 166-168

In February 1953, Minister of Education Okano Seigo told the Diet, "I do not wish to pass judgment on the rightness or wrongness of the Greater East Asian War, but the fact that Japan took on so many opponents and fought them for four years . . . proves our superiority."44 Hattori Takashiro's History of the Greater East Asian War, published in 1953, described the bravery of Japanese forces as "so gallant that the gods would be moved to tears."45 Ienaga Saburo, an iconoclast who has no kind word for any World War II combat­ant, was one of the few scholars who tried to keep a picture of Japan's depredations before students. A high school history text he wrote in 1963 was rejected by the Education Ministry. Ienaga sued: During the trial a government brief elaborated on the shortcomings of my manuscript. Certain phrases such as "The war was glorified as a 'holy cause,'" "atrocities by Japanese troops," and "reckless war" were objectionable because "These are excessively critical of Japan's position and actions in World War II and do not give students a proper under­standing of this country's position and actions in the war." . . . Whereas the great majority of students and children used to have a negative attitude toward the war, recently approval of Japan's actions has been increasing.46 The court battle went on for decades. The ministry was deter­mined to allow only a whitewashed version of the Pacific War to be presented. Ienaga kept coming back with new challenges to his opponents. In 1993, twenty-eight years after he filed his first suit, the Japanese Supreme Court ruled "that the Government was well within its rights when it forced Mr. Ienaga to delete uncomfortable particulars about how Japan invaded Korea and Manchuria, and to skip by the rape and killings that accompanied the occupation of Southeast Asia."47 A year later, in 1994, the Court reversed itself, condemning Education Ministry censors and upholding Ienaga.48 It remains to be seen whether the history taught in Japanese schools will now change significantly. Japan's textbook controversy was never a hot news item in the United States. In China it was one of the greatest irritants in Sino-Japanese relations. Allen Whiting, in his book China Eyes Japan, devotes a chapter to the intense Chinese reaction in 1982 and 1986 when the Japanese Education Ministry authorized textbook changes to further prettify Japan's wartime record. Whiting quotes a 15 August 1982 editorial in the official Chinese youth newspaper warn­ing that the Japanese "attempt to deceive the younger generation through education" was part of a dream of reviving militarism, but it would fail; "how could historical facts written in blood be con­cealed by lies written in ink?" There follows a brief but graphic list of Japanese atrocities and the contention that "even the German fas­cists labeled Japanese soldiers as a 'group of beasts.'"49 China was not buying any "Japan as victim" scenario. China's killed and wounded at Japanese hands may not have been as high as the Chinese now claim (21.8 million), but Japan was certainly in the cat­egory of perpetrator rather than victim. Whiting is correct on the significance of Chinese bitterness about this matter: The repeated references in the Chinese media to the Nanjing death tolls as greater than the combined casualties from the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki convey multiple messages. First, these references imply that there is a double standard at work: world attention focuses on the victims of the atomic bombs and ignores China's greater loss. Second, these references also seek to point out that Japan wins sympathy as the victim and the United States is cast as the nuclear villain even though Japan started the war. This allows Japan to avoid any feelings of guilt for the invasion of China and the Nanjing atrocities. Third, these references make the point that the Nanjing Massacre was worse than Hiroshima and Nagasaki because it occurred piecemeal through the personal actions of individuals whereas the atomic holocausts occurred instanta­neously from high-altitude bombing.50 The third implication should perhaps be amended. The atomic bombings were justified not because they came from great altitude, but because they had a legitimate purpose: to end the war. The Nanking massacre was sheer bestiality.

Proves they’re the bad kind of absolutism – if we win the facts of the historical debate, then they’re saying its ethical to kill people

Bogdanor, 2008 Paul, British Author and expert on Jewish History, Replies to “The Atomic Bomb and Hiroshima: The “least abhorrent choice””

 mettaculture wrote:- Your argument for the moral acceptability of the Atomic bombing of Japan is based upon what zdenek tells you is called Consequentialism, which you do not seem to understand. Put graphically this is the doctrine that ‘the end justifies the means’. zdenek wrote:- I think you have zeroed in on the weak (or at least undefended)part of Michael Ezra’s argument which is his consequentialism (without this his argument does not work)… In other words there is a perfectly respectable way of defending Michael’s view and would go something like this: true, just war doctrine rules out Utilitarian calculations but I disagree that that is decisive because I think that Utilitarianism is the best/most plausible moral theory available. This is a total misunderstanding of the issues. If you accept the factual case that Japan was not prepared to surrender peacefully, then the policy options were these:- 1. Use the atom bomb. 2. Invade and occupy Japan. 3. Blockade Japan to starve the population into surrender. Each of these options involved indiscriminate mass killing. The atom bombs killed tens of thousands of innocents. The alternatives would have killed millions of innocents. The moral argument for using the atom bomb does not rest on consequentialism. It does not rest on the principle that if there’s an alternative to killing the innocent, you may nevertheless choose to kill them because it will save lives. It rests on the absolutist principle that when there’s no alternative to killing the innocent, you must choose the option that minimises the killing. Hence Michael Ezra’s statement that it would have been a crime not to use the atom bomb. Those who accept his historical argument but reject the bombings on moral grounds must explain why they would have chosen to kill millions of innocent people rather than tens of thousands.

### 1NC

**104 nuclear power plants located near large cities are at risk of likely attack – causes economic slowdown, loss of agriculture, loss of life and drive for vengeance**

Mott 7 (Fall, 2007 UCLA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 12 UCLA J. Int'l L. & For. Aff. 333 “SHOULD THE THREAT OF A TERRORIST ATTACK ON A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT BE CONSIDERED UNDER NEPA REVIEW?”, Amanda, JD candidate at Vermont Law School, Vermont Journal of Environmental Law junior staff member.)

The two most vulnerable parts of the nuclear power plant are the nuclear [\*337] reactors [n19](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1354070972165&returnToKey=20_T16163507195&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.404903.8041104185#n19) and the spent fuel pools. [n20](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1354070972165&returnToKey=20_T16163507195&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.404903.8041104185#n20) Radiation can be released from these areas in various ways, including meltdown, explosion and fire. Each method of radiation release has an extremely different impact. [n21](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1354070972165&returnToKey=20_T16163507195&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.404903.8041104185#n21) The result is nuclear violence which has environmental, physical, and psychological consequences. [n22](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1354070972165&returnToKey=20_T16163507195&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.404903.8041104185#n22) Moreover, society feels the social, cultural and economic effects of such a disaster. [n23](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1354070972165&returnToKey=20_T16163507195&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.404903.8041104185#n23) Withholding or distorting information concerning the risks of a nuclear disaster is a type of cruelty. [n24](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1354070972165&returnToKey=20_T16163507195&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.404903.8041104185#n24) All of these factors should be taken into consideration when deliberating the effects of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. The consequences of nuclear catastrophes are endless. The problems of their contamination will persist for many years. [n25](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1354070972165&returnToKey=20_T16163507195&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.404903.8041104185#n25) A number of the previously mentioned 104 nuclear power plants are located near large cities: [n26](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1354070972165&returnToKey=20_T16163507195&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.404903.8041104185#n26) Indian Point is located near New York; Calvert Cliffs is forty-five miles from Washington, DC; Limerick lies twenty miles outside Philadelphia; Monticello and Prairie Island are within forty miles of Minneapolis-St. Paul; and Shearon Harris is twenty miles from North Carolina's research triangle. [n27](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1354070972165&returnToKey=20_T16163507195&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.404903.8041104185#n27) The distances are important because wind currents [\*338] can carry the radioactive fallout from nuclear blasts hundreds of miles. [n28](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1354070972165&returnToKey=20_T16163507195&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.404903.8041104185#n28) Not only will those in the immediate vicinity of the nuclear plant feel the effects of the fallout, but so will those far away. [n29](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1354070972165&returnToKey=20_T16163507195&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.404903.8041104185#n29) As the Chernobyl accident illustrated, contamination scatters irregularly, depending on weather conditions. [n30](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1354070972165&returnToKey=20_T16163507195&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.404903.8041104185#n30) On March 1, 1954, the United States tested an H-bomb design on Bikini Atoll. [n31](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1354070972165&returnToKey=20_T16163507195&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.404903.8041104185#n31) The result was a nuclear explosion with potentially lethal radioactive fallout enveloping nearly 5,000 square kilometers. [n32](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1354070972165&returnToKey=20_T16163507195&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.404903.8041104185#n32) Dispersion of this radioactive material can cause numerous health and environmental problems. [n33](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1354070972165&returnToKey=20_T16163507195&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.404903.8041104185#n33) Health effects include radiation sickness, genetic mutations (which can cause cancer or be passed on to the next generation) and psychological problems. [n34](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1354070972165&returnToKey=20_T16163507195&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.404903.8041104185#n34) Environmental effects include radioactive contamination of land and water, as well as harm to the ozone layer. [n35](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1354070972165&returnToKey=20_T16163507195&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.404903.8041104185#n35) The fallout also affects agriculture, farm animals and food crop. [n36](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1354070972165&returnToKey=20_T16163507195&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.404903.8041104185#n36) The material [\*339] can be released via: (1) air-gaseous releases, (2) water-liquid releases, (3) solid releases-ground effects, or (4) ultimate disposal of spent fuel. [n37](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1354070972165&returnToKey=20_T16163507195&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.404903.8041104185" \l "n37)

#### Public disclosure under NEPA would give terrorists the ATTACK plans allowing them to circumvent safeguards

Meserve 2 (In the Matter of PRIVATE FUEL STORAGE L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation) Docket No. 72-22-ISFSI; CLI-02-25 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 56 N.R.C. 340; 2002 NRC LEXIS 205 December 18, 2002 CORE TERMS: terrorism, terrorist attack, terrorist, reasonably foreseeable, licensing, nuclear, probability, sabotage, environmental, worst, regulation, staff, licensee, plant, speculative, ongoing, scenario, nuclear power plant, meaningfully, storage, practicable, conceivable, safeguards, airborne, barrier, reactor, nuclear power, likely to occur, agency action, fuel JUDGES: [\*1] COMMISSIONERS Richard A. Meserve, Chairman; Greta Joy Dicus; Nils J. Diaz; Edward McGaffigan, Jr.; Jeffrey S. Merrifield)

NEPA's Public Process Is Not a Forum for Sensitive [\*29] Security Issues. Although we conclude in the previous discussion that there is no basis on which to provide a reasonable measure of the risk of terrorism and that the risk of terrorism is far afield from issues involving the natural environment of the facility, the Commission is presently engaged in analyzing how to keep such risk at a minimum. Part of this effort is to protect sensitive information from failing into the hands of those with malevolent intentions. The public aspect of NEPA processes conflicts with the need to protect certain sensitive information. NEPA requires agencies to include the public in NEPA reviews. n54 Indeed, public information and public participation form a large part of NEPA's raison d'etre. n55 At the NRC, public input includes not just an opportunity to comment on draft EIS's, but also an opportunity to contest environmental findings at agency hearings on the licensing action in question. n54 See [42 U.S.C. § 4332](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/mungo/lexseestat.do?bct=A&risb=21_T16060316211&homeCsi=5334&A=0.6869160745881923&urlEnc=ISO-8859-1&&citeString=42%20USC%204332&countryCode=USA&_md5=00000000000000000000000000000000). n55 See [Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. at 356.](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/mungo/lexseestat.do?bct=A&risb=21_T16060316211&homeCsi=5334&A=0.6869160745881923&urlEnc=ISO-8859-1&&citeString=490%20U.S.%20332,at%20356&countryCode=USA&_md5=00000000000000000000000000000000) In our view, the public interest would not be served by inquiries at NRC hearings and public meetings into [\*30] where and how nuclear facilities are vulnerable, how they are protected and secured, and what consequences would ensue if security measures failed at a particular facility. Such NEPA reviews may well have the perverse effect of assisting terrorists seeking effective means to cause a release of radioactivity with potential health and safety consequences. Years ago, before NEPA's enactment, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) considered the question whether it should use its hearing process to assess the risk of "enemy attack or sabotage" against a particular facility (the Turkey Point reactor in Florida). n56 The AEC rejected the idea, holding that "examination into the above matters, apart from their extremely speculative nature, would involve information singularly sensitive from the standpoint of . . . our national defense." n57 Such matters, according to the AEC, are "clearly not amenable to board consideration and determination." n58 The AEC commented that it "would not propose to make them cognizable issues in the absence of a clear Congressional direction to that end." n59 Congress has enacted no such directive. n56 Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Units No. 3 and 4), 4 AEC 9, 13-14 (Commission 1967), aff'd sub. nom. [Siegel v. AEC, 400 F.2d 778 (D.C. Cir. 1968).](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/mungo/lexseestat.do?bct=A&risb=21_T16060316211&homeCsi=5334&A=0.6869160745881923&urlEnc=ISO-8859-1&&citeString=400%20F.2d%20778&countryCode=USA&_md5=00000000000000000000000000000000) n57 Id. at 14. n58 Id. n59 Id. [\*31] NEPA does not override the AEC's (and our) concern for making sure that sensitive security-related information ends up in as few hands as practicable. NEPA itself includes limiting provisions. Section 101(b) of NEPA requires agencies to implement the statute's policies using "all practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations of national policy." n60 Another passage in the same section provides that the federal government's efforts to "attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment" are subject to restraints based on "risk to health and safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences." n61 These provisions caution against using the NEPA process for a terrorism review. A full-scale NEPA process inevitably would require examination not only of how terrorists could cause maximum damage but also of how they might best be thwarted. But keeping those kinds of information secret is vital. To use NEPA's own terms, confidentiality in this area is an "essential consideration of national policy," protects against "risks to health and safety," and avoids "undesirable and unintended consequences." n60 [42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/mungo/lexseestat.do?bct=A&risb=21_T16060316211&homeCsi=5334&A=0.6869160745881923&urlEnc=ISO-8859-1&&citeString=42%20USC%204331&countryCode=USA&_md5=00000000000000000000000000000000) (emphases added). See also NEPA § 101(a), [42 U.S.C. § 4331(a)](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/mungo/lexseestat.do?bct=A&risb=21_T16060316211&homeCsi=5334&A=0.6869160745881923&urlEnc=ISO-8859-1&&citeString=42%20USC%204331&countryCode=USA&_md5=00000000000000000000000000000000) ("it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government . . . to use all practicable means and measures . . . . To create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future generations of Americans." (emphasis added)). n61 [42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(3)](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/mungo/lexseestat.do?bct=A&risb=21_T16060316211&homeCsi=5334&A=0.6869160745881923&urlEnc=ISO-8859-1&&citeString=42%20USC%204331&countryCode=USA&_md5=00000000000000000000000000000000). [\*32] For the NRC, protecting safeguards information is not simply a policy choice. It is required by law. Section 147 of the AEA provides that the NRC "shall" prohibit unauthorized disclosures of key security-related information. Consequently, the NRC cannot make publicly available the kind of information necessary for a more than superficial NEPA review. n62 This limitation on information availability supports our decision not to use NEPA, in part a public information statute, as our vehicle to analyze terrorism. n63 n62

#### The terrorism we describe is not solely foreign-born – white supremacist groups are planning to use weapons of mass destruction against areas with high minority populations – recent American Front case proves

Minnis 12 (White Supremacist Group Plan Foiled, [May 10, 2012](http://blackamericaweb.com/date/2012/05/10/), By Glenn Minnis, special to Blackamericaweb.com, Glenn Minnis is a NYC-based sports and culture writer. Follow him on Twitter at @glennnyc)

Florida police have charged ten members of a white supremacist group with actively plotting and preparing for what they deemed an “inevitable” race war by targeting various city buildings and marked dwellings known to be occupied or frequented by minorities for planned attack and ultimately total annihilation. FBI agents and a team of terrorism task force officers began corralling suspects over the weekend, largely based on evidence uncovered by an undercover informant who infiltrated the neo-Nazi organization known as the American Front (AF) nearly 17-months ago. Among other violently egregious acts, affidavits show the volatile group planned to begin manufacturing ricin, a poisonous white powder categorized by those in the know as a potential “weapon of mass destruction.” In addition, group members often religiously convened at an isolated, fortified compound that was guarded by barbwire fences and pit bull dogs where they trained with AK-47s, shotguns and various forms of explosives. The grounds were also riddled with fortified entrenchments made from railroad timbers, cement pilings and other materials which members also used to engage in hand-to-hand combat training and where survivalist-type supplies such as water and ready-to-eat meals were stored in abundance. According to investigators, the property was structured to serve as a refuge for white supremacists after the destruction of the U.S. government and at the height of the sure to follow race war. The group, which also mastered the art of designing and crafting body armor and sniper suits, was at one point aided by the expertise of a trained member of the National Guard who traveled there from Missouri and signed on as a full-fledged AF member. Authorities added that group members also harbored unflinching vendettas against Jews and immigrants and planned to attack those groups as well. “This investigation is a result of our on-going partnership with local law enforcement and federal agencies in a concentrated effort to stamp out hate crime in our community,” said Florida States Attorney Lawson Lamar. In a written statement, FBI agents furthered sought to stress the critical nature of the situation by describing the group as a bonafide “military-styled, domestic terrorist organization.” Authorities have fingered 39-year-old Marcus Faella, who describes himself as “the protector of the white race,” and his 36-year-old wife, Patricia, as the ringleaders of the group. Charges against the pair range from felony conspiracy as a hate crime to engaging in paramilitary training, likewise a Class A felony. “Marcus Faella has been planning and preparing the AF for this,” authorities outlined in an affidavit calling for his apprehension. “Faella has stated his intent during the race war to kill Jews, immigrants and other minorities. Faella believes the race war will take place within the next few years based on current world events.” Thus, mere miles from where voluntary neighborhood watchman George Zimmerman shot to death unarmed 17-year-old Trayvon Martin back in late February, setting off a firestorm that has since gripped and divided the nation along racial lines, Faella stoked the fire of his charges by imploring them to visualize jugs they shot at during regularly scheduled target practices as “the heads of black people.” As recently as February, Faella allegedly began plotting to “cause a disturbance” at Orlando’s City Hall “so that the media would report on it and attract new recruits to AF.” Court documents show he felt the group, originally established in 1987, had been dormant for far too long and needed to reaffirm its white-hot views. As part of his master plan, Faella allegedly wanted AF members to confront members of an anti-racism group called the REDS and “put their teeth to the curb— an apparent reference to the more violent scenes played out violent in “American X,” a 1998 cult film well versed in the roots of racial hatred. Though determined as ever, in recent months investigators say Faella grew even more erratic, ordering AF members to commit varying crimes on the groups’ behalf in an effort to generate more buzz. Police decided to intercede after learning Faella was planning to attack REDS members during a ‘May Day’ event in nearby Melbourne, a time when he also planned to shoot up the homes of several of the group’s lead officials.

#### Even if a few die, retaliation will ensue

BYMAN ‘7 - director of the Center for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service (Daniel, September. US Counter-Terrorism Options, Survival. Vol. 49, Is. 3, informaworld)

One of the biggest problems with containment is the home front. Containment is the antithesis of a ’crush‘ strategy, and thus appears as weakness to domestic audiences who are scared, angry and hungry for vengeance after a terrorist attack. This public response is not based on a rational calculation of the risks. Yet terrorism scares people. **Even a limited number of deaths**, particularly on home soil, thus has a disproportionate psychological effect. Work stops, and people refuse to travel. Public confidence in government plunges. This may be irrational from an actuarial point of view, but policymakers must adjust policy to cope with the behaviour of their citizens. Moreover, every government must ensure the security of its citizens to be credible, and the deliberate murder of civilians is a direct challenge to a government’s legitimacy. **It is impossible for politicians not to respond to such provocations**. The Bush administration has spent the years since 11 September telling the American people how dangerous the threat is, and most Democratic politicians have joined in the chorus. When politicians try to soften their rhetoric on terrorism, they face tremendous criticism. During the waning days of the 2004 elections, Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry told the New York Times that he wanted to turn terrorism into a ‘nuisance’ like crime; President Bush told reporters that the United States would never achieve a clear victory in the war. The public outcry forced both to ‘clarify’ – that is, to disown – their statements. One cannot take the politics out of counter-terrorism. The painful reality might be that ‘doing something‘ – whether spending money on homeland security or **acting aggressively abroad** – is necessary to reassure people after a massive attack on the homeland, since a perception that the government was passive could contribute to a **massive overreaction**. Reaction may be necessary to prevent overreaction.

### 1NC

**We should call out the NRC NOT for everything, but for most of their campaigns of secrecy. We stand in opposition to their refusal to test the ground, the water, the air. We stand in opposition to their refusal to disclose information with everything except Environmental Impact Assessments that look at acts of direct sabotage. We believe that a non-public version of the Environmental Impact Assessment for acts of direct sabotage should be created and then reviewed by a combination of NRC, elected local and Congressional party members all sworn to secrecy. All other acts of the licensing process should be made public. In order for any Environmental Impact Assessment on acts of sabotage to be used to justify licensing, it must have support of the elected local leaders.**

#### This solves all of your aff – localized, secret oversight committees on the sabotage EIS’s allow for the public voice without creating a blueprint for sabotage.

Farris 7 (“Annual Review of Environmental and Natural Resources Law: Note: Mothers for Peace and the Need to Develop Classified NEPA Procedures”, ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY, 34, 955, JD Candidate UC Berkeley, 2008)

Professor Dycus suggests that, "even without judicial enforcement, Congress could monitor compliance with NEPA by requiring that each secret EIS or part thereof be reported to one or more congressional committees with oversight responsibility." [n121](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1354132881705&returnToKey=20_T16172214677&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.845223.7127555407#n121) He illustrates how this system might function using the example of the Intelligence Oversight Committees of both houses, which receive reports of secret intelligence agency actions. [n122](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1354132881705&returnToKey=20_T16172214677&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.845223.7127555407#n122) These committees do not have authority to overrule intelligence agency actions, but they authorize appropriations and have subpoena power, which gives them significant practical power. [n123](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1354132881705&returnToKey=20_T16172214677&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.845223.7127555407#n123) The committees have created secure proceedings, which have been successful at preventing information leaks. [n124](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1354132881705&returnToKey=20_T16172214677&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.845223.7127555407#n124) The hearings are open to the committee itself, testifying witnesses, and committee staff, but are closed to the public. n125The experience of the Intelligence Oversight Committees shows that designing a committee structure that maintains its independence and effectiveness is not simple. For example, in the past, the members of the House and Senate Intelligence Oversight Committees could not serve more than eight consecutive years. [n126](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1354132881705&returnToKey=20_T16172214677&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.845223.7127555407#n126) That term limit was imposed because of fears of capture by the intelligence community. [n127](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1354132881705&returnToKey=20_T16172214677&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.845223.7127555407#n127) But several outside reviewers, including the 9/11 Commission, recommended that  [\*973]  these term limits be eliminated due to the length of time required to master the complex subject matter of national security. [n128](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1354132881705&returnToKey=20_T16172214677&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.845223.7127555407#n128) According to one recommendation, the eight-year turnover caused an unfortunate "loss of expertise and continuity." [n129](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1354132881705&returnToKey=20_T16172214677&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.845223.7127555407#n129) As a result, the Senate has done away with these term limits, but the House still maintains them. [n130](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1354132881705&returnToKey=20_T16172214677&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.845223.7127555407#n130) A specialized congressional oversight committee to review classified environmental matters would similarly require a balance between the desire to avoid capture by government agencies and maintenance of committee expertise.

### Case

#### Nuclear technocracy’s good

Nordhaus 11, chairman – Breakthrough Instiute, and Shellenberger, president – Breakthrough Insitute, MA cultural anthropology – University of California, Santa Cruz, 2/25/‘11

(Ted and Michael, <http://thebreakthrough.org/archive/the_long_death_of_environmenta>)

Tenth, we are going to have to get over our suspicion of technology, especially nuclear power. There is **no credible path** to reducing global carbon emissions without an enormous expansion of nuclear power. It is the only low carbon technology we have today with the demonstrated capability to generate large quantities of centrally generated electrtic power. It is the low carbon of technology of choice for much of the rest of the world. Even uber-green nations, like Germany and Sweden, have reversed plans to phase out nuclear power as they have begun to reconcile their energy needs with their climate commitments. Eleventh, we will need to embrace again the role of the state as a direct provider of public goods. The modern environmental movement, borne of the new left rejection of social authority of all sorts, has embraced the notion of state regulation and even creation of private markets while largely rejecting the generative role of the state. In the modern environmental imagination, government promotion of technology - whether nuclear power, the green revolution, synfuels, or ethanol - almost always ends badly. Never mind that virtually the entire history of American industrialization and technological innovation is the story of government investments in the development and commercialization of new technologies. Think of a transformative technology over the last century - computers, the Internet, pharmaceutical drugs, jet turbines, cellular telephones, nuclear power - and what you will find is government investing in those technologies at a scale that private firms simply cannot replicate. Twelveth, big is beautiful. The rising economies of the developing world will continue to develop whether we want them to or not. The solution to the ecological crises wrought by modernity, technology, and progress will be more modernity, technology, and progress. The solutions to the ecological challenges faced by a planet of 6 billion going on 9 billion will not be decentralized energy technologies like solar panels, small scale organic agriculture, and a drawing of unenforceable boundaries around what remains of our ecological inheritance, be it the rainforests of the Amazon or the chemical composition of the atmosphere. Rather, these solutions will be: large central station power technologies that can meet the energy needs of billions of people increasingly living in the dense mega-cities of the global south without emitting carbon dioxide, further intensification of industrial scale agriculture to meet the nutritional needs of a population that is not only growing but eating higher up the food chain, and a whole suite of new agricultural, desalinization and other technologies for gardening planet Earth that might allow us not only to pull back from forests and other threatened ecosystems but also to create new ones. The New Ecological Politics The great ecological challenges that our generation faces demands an ecological politics that is **generative, not restrictive.** An ecological politics capable of addressing global warming will require us to reexamine virtually every prominent strand of post-war green ideology. From Paul Erlich's warnings of a population bomb to The Club of Rome's "Limits to Growth," contemporary ecological politics have consistently embraced green Malthusianism despite the fact that the Malthusian premise has persistently failed for the better part of three centuries. Indeed, the green revolution was exponentially increasing agricultural yields at the very moment that Erlich was predicting mass starvation and the serial predictions of peak oil and various others resource collapses that have followed have continue to fail. This does not mean that Malthusian outcomes are impossible, but neither are they inevitable. **We do have a choice** in the matter, but it is not the choice that greens have long imagined. The choice that humanity faces is not whether to constrain our growth, development, and aspirations or die. It is whether we will continue to innovate and accelerate technological progress in order to thrive. Human technology and ingenuity have repeatedly confounded Malthusian predictions yet green ideology continues to cast a suspect eye towards the very technologies that have allowed us to avoid resource and ecological catastrophes. But such solutions will require environmentalists to abandon the "small is beautiful" ethic that has also characterized environmental thought since the 1960's. We, the most secure, affluent, and thoroughly modern human beings to have ever lived upon the planet, must abandon both the dark, zero-sum Malthusian visions and the idealized and nostalgic fantasies for a simpler, more bucolic past in which humans lived in harmony with Nature.

#### Political engagement key to solve

**Kuzemko 12** [Caroline Kuzemko, CSGR University of Warwick, Security, the State and Political Agency: Putting ‘Politics’ back into UK Energy, http://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2012/381\_61.pdf]

Both Hay (2007) and Flinders and Buller (2006) suggest that there are other forms that depoliticisation can take, or in the terminology of Flinders and Buller ‘tactics’ which politicians can pursue in order to move a policy field to a more indirect governing relationship (Flinders and Buller 2006: 296). For the purposes of understanding the depoliticisation of UK energy policy, however, two of Colin Hay’s forms of depoliticisation are most useful: the ‘… offloading of areas of formal political responsibility to the market…’ and the passing of policymaking responsibility to quasipublic, or independent, authorities (Hay 2007: 82-3). 1 What each of these forms of depoliticisation has in common is the degree to which they can serve, over time, to reduce political capacity by removing processes of deliberation and contestation, thereby reducing the ability for informed agency and choice. In that politics can be understood as being inclusive of processes of deliberation, contestation, informed agency and collective choice the lack of deliberation and capacity for informed agency would result in sub-optimal politics (Hay 2007: 67; cf. Gamble 2000; Wood 2011; Jenkins 2011). There seems little doubt that, with regard to energy as a policy area, the principal of establishing a more indirect governing system had become accepted by UK political elites. One of the very few close observers of UK energy policy from the 1980s to early 2000s claims that both Conservative and New Labour politicians had actively sought to remove energy from politics, making it an ‘economic’ subject: From the early 1980s, British energy policy, and its associated regulatory regime, was designed to transform a state-owned and directed sector into a normal commodity market. Competition and 1 "These"forms"are"referred"to"elsewhere"by"the"author"as"‘marketised’"and"‘technocratic’"depoliticisation"(Kuzemko" 2012b:").liberalization would, its architects hoped, take energy out of the political arena… Labour shared this vision and hoped that energy would drop off the political agenda…. (Helm 2003: 386) 2 As already suggested this paper considers the intention to depoliticise energy to have been reasonably successful. By the early 2000s the Energy Ministry had been disbanded, there was little or no formal Parliamentary debate, energy was not represented at Cabinet level, responsibility for the supply of energy had been passed to the markets, it was regulated by an independent body, and the (cf. Kuzemko 2012b). Furthermore, the newly formed Energy Directorate within the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), which now had responsibility for energy policy, had no specific energy mandates but instead mandates regarding encouraging the right conditions for business with an emphasis on competition (Helm et al 1989: 55; cf. Kuzemko 2012b: 107). As feared by various analysts who write about depoliticisation as a sub-optimal form of politics, these processes of depoliticisation had arguably resulted in a lack of deliberation about energy and its governance outside of narrow technocratic elite circles. Within these circles energy systems were modelled, language was specific and often unintelligible to others, including generalist politicians or wider publics, and this did, indeed, further encourage a high degree of disengagement with the subject (cf. Kern 2010; Kuzemko 2012b; Stern 1987). Technical language and hiring practices that emphasised certain forms of economic education further isolated elite technocratic circles from political contestation and other forms of knowledge about energy. Arguably, by placing those actors who have been elected to represent the national collective interest at one remove from processes of energy governance the result was a lack of formal political capacity in this policy field. It is worth, briefly, at this point reiterating the paradoxical nature of depoliticisation. Whilst decisions to depoliticise are deeply political, political capacity to deliberate, contest and act in an issue area can be reduced through these processes. Depoliticisation has been an ongoing form of governing throughout the 20 th century it may (Burnham 2001: 464), however, be particularly powerful and more difficult to reverse when underpinned by increasingly dominant ideas about how best to govern. For example Hay, in looking for the domestic sources of depoliticisation in the 1980s and 1990s, suggests that these processes were firmly underpinned by neoliberal and public choice ideas not only about the role of the state but also about the ability for political actors to make sound decisions relating, in particular, to economic governance (Hay 2007: 95-99). Given the degree to which such ideas were held increasingly to be legitimate over this time period depoliticisation was, arguably, genuinely understood by many as a process that would result in better governance (Interviews 1, 2, 3, 15 cf. Hay 2007: 94; Kern 2010). This to a certain extent makes decisions to depoliticise appear both less instrumental but also harder to reverse given the degree to which such ideas become further entrenched via processes of depoliticisation (cf. Kuzemko 2012b: 61-66; Wood 2011: 7).

#### The ends justify the means

Isaac 2 (Jeffrey, Professor of PoliSci @ Indiana-Bloomington, Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life, PhD Yale, “Ends, Means, and Politics,” Dissent Magazine Vol 49 Issue 2)

As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law [it] can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### Turn- Japanese nuclear power key to their economy

Saunders 1/7

(Japan's Pro-Nuclear Cabinet Fight Future Disaster With Reformed Policies By Abbie Saunders MONDAY JANUARY 07, 2013 http://www.theinternational.org/articles/294-japans-pro-nuclear-cabinet-fight-future)

The repercussions of nuclear energy: self-sufficiency or Nationalism? The tension between the economic and the environmental motives for nuclear energy in Japan provokes concerns about the political motives for such a risky investment. The wider repercussions of reinstating nuclear energy suggest a political move towards either self-sufficiency or Nationalism. Many journalists have already commented upon this tension; Hannah Beech says that “the country’s mood is the most nationalistic in decades”. Is nuclear energy just a stepping stone in establishing Mr Abe’s three main objectives for the new government? The Economist cites Mr Abe’s top priorities for Japan’s cabinet in the coming months: revision of the American-imposed constitution of 1946, the undervaluation of patriotism in the education system, and the security treaty with the United States, before going on to suggest that “this is a cabinet of radical nationalists”. But there is a fine line between self-sufficiency and Nationalism. Having relied upon America for peace politics since the 1940s, endured an economic collapse as a result of a dramatic increase in import, and suffered at the hands of multiple natural disasters, consequently draining national resources, Japan’s proposed steps towards self-sufficiency might make for a stronger nation. Hannah Beech suggests that “national debt still stands at twice the size of the economy, exports have dropped dramatically, and Japan teeters on the edge of another recession. More than a third of Japanese cannot find full-time jobs”. Perhaps rather than radical Nationalism, the reinstatement of nuclear energy simply marks a stepping stone on Japan’s road to recovery.

#### Japanese economy is key to check global economic collapse and nuclear war with China

The Guardian 2-11-2002, p ln

Even so, the west cannot afford to be complacent about what is happening in Japan, unless it intends to use the country as a test case to explore whether a full-scale depression is less painful now than it was 70 years ago. Action is needed, and quickly because this is an economy that could soak up some of the world's excess capacity if functioning properly. A strong Japan is not only essential for the long-term health of the global economy, it is also needed as a counter-weight to the growing power of China. A collapse in the Japanese economy, which looks ever more likely, would have profound ramifications; some experts believe it could even unleash a wave of **extreme nationalism that would push the country into conflict** **with its** bigger (and **nuclear) neighbour**.

#### Sino-Japan war goes nuclear

Richard Samuels, IR prof at MIT, 1999, The U.S. Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future, p. 6-7

The same forces that lead China and Japan into an adversarial relationship in the first place might well push them to the brink of war. From a U.S. perspective, **this would be disastrous**, for several reasons: -War between two of America's largest trading partners would be devastating to the U.S. economy -U.S. involvement would be difficult to avoid in a war between a former ally and a former enemy -War between a nuclear power and a threshold nuclear power would **push the envelope** in new and disconcerting ways -War between the two would be (another) humanitarian disaster -Nuclearization in Japan would press both Koreas to do the same, and perhaps **pressure other Asian nations to follow suite.** Even if China and Japan did not go to war, a Cold War between the two great powers could **impose high costs** on the region, and indeed the globe, if the last simmering conflict between two giants on the world scene has taught us anything. At a minimum, the remarkable (and hard-earned) domestic politics stability in Japan would further unravel, creating even greater uncertainties for its foreign policy and its evolving role as provider of global public goods.